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Are pension contributions a threat to shareholder payouts?   
Seth Armitage and Ronan Gallagher1 
February 2019 
 
Abstract 
 UK companies have been making large contributions to reduce the deficits of 
their pension funds, and are believed to fund such contributions in part by 
reducing dividends. Using data from 2003-16, we find little evidence that large 
deficit-reduction contributions are associated with reductions in regular 
dividends, though we find some restraint in dividend increases and total payout. 
Most companies make large contributions when they have healthy cash flows 
and strong profitability, or inflows from disposals of assets. This suggests that 
the Pensions Regulator allows companies flexibility regarding the timing of 
contributions. 
 
1. Introduction 
 Until the 1990s, most large British companies provided their staff a defined-benefit 
(DB) pension scheme, in which pension benefits are underpinned by a contractual requirement 
for the employer to ensure that the scheme can meet its obligations. Since then, many 
companies and public-sector organisations have closed their DB schemes to new members, and 
many have frozen accrual of benefits for existing members.2 One possible reason for the demise 
of DB schemes is a perceived threat to shareholder payouts. 
                                                 
1 University of Edinburgh Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, United Kingdom, EH8 9JS 
2 The proportion of pension scheme members in fully open DB schemes declined from 66% in 2006 to 19% in 
2016 (Pension Protection Fund, 2016). 
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 A company whose pension fund is in deficit is required over time to inject sufficient 
funds to eliminate the deficit. Cutting the dividend is one way of releasing funds. On 29 October 
2016 the Financial Times reported that ‘investors in the UK stock market are expected to 
receive £3.6bn less in dividend payments than anticipated, as companies divert money to 
address the sharp rise in their pension deficits’. Consultants JLT Group (2017, p. 9) highlight 
a ‘conflict of interest between employers and trustees’, and present tables that ‘capture 
employers’ reluctance towards contributing to their pension scheme against their relative 
enthusiasm for declaring dividends’. Analysis by the regulator of the affordability of 
contributions includes extensive comparisons with dividends (Pensions Regulator, 2016, 
2017). The threat to dividends is confirmed by two UK studies which report a strong negative 
relation between pension contribution and dividend (Bunn and Trivedi, 2005; Liu and Tonks, 
2013), supported to an extent by Bunn, Mizen and Smietanka (2018). 
 Deficit-reduction contributions (DRCs) are certainly a cost to companies, and they have 
to be funded somehow. However our results differ from the popular perception that DRCs 
cause reductions in dividends, and from the results of previous UK studies. We find little 
evidence that DRCs give rise to reductions or omissions in dividend per share (DPS), in the 
absence of other sufficient reasons. Regression results using the methods in previous studies 
show no statistically significant relation between dividend or payout and DRC. Analysis of 
how DRCs are funded reveals that large DRCs tend to be paid in years when companies have 
healthy cash flows and profits, which helps them avoid having to cut DPS. The results indicate 
that companies have flexibility regarding when they pay large DRCs. 
 Our sample of DRCs is from 2003-16. Annual reports since 2003 include for the first 
time both the cash contribution by the company and service cost (present value of additional 
pension benefits accrued during the year). This enables us to estimate DRC as contribution 
minus service cost. The sample period also largely post-dates the UK Pensions Act 2004, which 
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was designed to ensure that DB schemes are adequately funded, and which established a new 
pensions regulator.  
 Our empirical strategy has three elements. First, we forecast DPS and total payout per 
share using the Lintner (1956) model. If DRCs are financed by diverting funds from dividends, 
we expect actual DPS and payout per share to undershoot their forecasts by increasing amounts, 
as DRC increases. Second, we follow the existing literature by using regression methods to 
estimate the effect of DRCs on payout. Third, we examine how DRCs are funded. 
 Using Lintner-model forecasts, there is a statistically significant effect of large DRCs 
on DPS, and a larger effect on payout per share. The effect on DPS arises partly because the 
proportion of companies which cut or omit DPS is higher when DRC is large (top quartile). 
But the proportion is also high of companies with another reason, such as a loss, that can 
explain a cut or omission. Most cuts and omissions in years with a large DRC would have been 
made for other reasons. Our evidence is consistent with the bulk of other evidence on dividend 
policy, which indicates that DPS is usually cut when profit falls, not when there is a large cash 
expenditure (such as a DRC). When we exclude firm-years with a cut or omission, around half 
of the average shortfall remains of DPS in relation to its Lintner forecast, for firm-years with a 
large DRC. This evidence suggests that large DRCs are associated with restraint in increasing 
DPS. However, using regression models to explain payout, estimated via OLS, Tobit and 
GMM, we find no significant relation between dividend or total payout and DRC. Thus the 
relation between dividend and DRC is sensitive to the model of how dividend is determined, 
and is not robust.  
 We go on to analyse how DRCs are funded. The main result is that large DRCs tend to 
be paid in years with large cash flows from operations, and with high profitability. This result 
helps explain why few large DRCs are associated with a cut in DPS in the absence of another 
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reason for the cut, and why DRCs give rise to restraint in increasing dividend.3 The results 
show in addition a robust positive relation between DRC and disposals, and a negative relation 
between DRC and share repurchases. We infer that companies are often able to time their 
pension contributions, such that they are made in years in which they have large cash inflows 
and profits, and large disposals. 
 The discretion that companies appear to have regarding timing of DRCs implies that 
they should not be viewed as cash flow shocks over which companies have little control. The 
UK regulatory regime, at least since 2004, appears to be more flexible than might be expected. 
Our evidence is consistent with policy information from the Pensions Regulator that regulation 
is mostly advisory rather than prescriptive, and that guidance it provides to scheme trustees 
takes account of the financial health and investment plans of companies. The regulator does 
not engage with most schemes; when it does so, it negotiates the scheme’s recovery plan with 
the trustees and sponsor (Pensions Regulator, 2014). Intervention to enforce payment of an 
imposed contribution is a last resort. 
 Our evidence contributes to research on the impact of pension contributions on 
company behaviour, challenging the view that DRCs are exogenous impositions that force 
companies to cut dividends. The paper extends existing evidence by using data on cash 
contributions that are only reported since 2003, by using Lintner forecasts of DPS and payout 
per share, and by studying total payout as well as regular dividend. It also adds to the evidence 
on how pension contributions are funded and determined (Bartram, 2017, 2018). 
 The results reinforce existing evidence that smoothing of regular dividends is a high 
priority for managers. One explanation for smoothing is that shareholders of widely held 
companies prefer smoothed dividends to control agency costs, and that companies respond 
                                                 
3 Suppose a company with a large increase in EPS pays a slightly higher DPS, and a large DRC. The Lintner 
forecast error is likely to be negative, because EPS is one of the two variables that determine forecast DPS. 
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accordingly, as discussed for example in Leary and Michaely (2011) and Michaely and Roberts 
(2012). In Lambrecht and Myers (2012), managers choose to smooth the rents they pay 
themselves in order to maximise their lifetime utility. Payout per year has to move in lockstep 
with managers’ rent, otherwise shareholders will either intervene, or receive more rent than is 
needed to avoid intervention. So smoothing of rents results in smoothing of payouts. In 
Acharya and Lambrecht (2015), payout smoothing is due to asymmetric information about 
profit. Shareholders’ estimates of profit, on which the payouts they require are based, are less 
volatile than actual profits, which shareholders are assumed to observe with measurement error. 
The lack of sensitivity we find of dividends to contributions is perhaps more consistent with 
the rent-smoothing explanation in Lambrecht and Myers (2012), which does not invoke 
information asymmetry. There is substantial disclosure of pension expense and contributions 
during our sample period. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 DB schemes and regulation  
 Adoption of DB schemes was widespread by the 1970s, especially in the public sector 
and among large companies. However by the 1990s closure of schemes was under way, 
gathering pace in the 2000s (see Sutcliffe, 2016, pp. 48-62). A fundamental reason for closures 
is that DB schemes have turned out to be more expensive to employers than expected. Many 
schemes moved into deficit, obliging employers to pay in extra contributions to reduce the 
deficits. Reasons for deficits included low stock-market returns in the 2000s, previous 
contribution holidays by some employers, and rising life expectancy and very low interest rates 
in the 2010s, both of which increased the present value of pension obligations. In addition, 
pension expense increased because the expected returns on fund assets fell in the 2010s, partly 
due to a sustained shift in asset allocation away from equity.  
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 Scheme deficits and dissatisfaction with pension governance and accounting prompted 
a wave of regulatory reform. This included the Pensions Acts of 1995 and 2004, and Financial 
Reporting Standard (FRS) 17 (2000) and International Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 (2001). 
The new accounting standards introduced greater disclosure about pension schemes, and 
required the volatile DB pension-fund surplus or deficit to be recognised on the balance sheet. 
This was a key change, which recognised the economic integration between a company and its 
DB scheme, but almost certainly accelerated scheme closures. 
 The Pensions Act 2004 was designed to provide better protection for DB scheme 
members, together with regulation that was responsive to the circumstances of individual 
schemes and their sponsors. The Act established the Pensions Regulator, with new powers to 
intervene, including the power to enforce payment of contributions. It also established the 
Pensions Protection Fund (PPF) to provide insurance in cases of schemes with a failed sponsor. 
An objective of the regulator is to reduce risks to the PPF. The 1995 and 2004 Acts contain 
provisions intended to prevent a sponsor from ‘walking away’ from a scheme in deficit. Under 
certain circumstances, including an application to the PPF, the deficit becomes a debt of the 
sponsor. 
 The 2004 Act abolished the Minimum Funding Requirement, introduced in 1995 but 
criticised in the government-commissioned Myners Report (2001) for being too mechanical 
and ‘distorting investment patterns without ensuring effective protection for members’ 
(paragraph 8.62). From 2004 the normal process is for scheme trustees (not the regulator) to 
agree contributions with sponsors. Engagement by the regulator is focused on schemes with 
severe deficits or where the employer’s ability to support the scheme is in doubt. A scheme-
specific recovery plan is negotiated, involving payment of minimum contributions, over an 
agreed number of years, that are expected to be sufficient to eliminate the deficit. The sponsor 
has some discretion about how much it contributes in any given year, and recovery plans are 
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reviewed over time. Guidance to trustees aims to balance a scheme’s need for funding with the 
amounts of contribution a company sponsor can afford, given its growth and investment plans. 
Concern for the sponsor helps protect the employer ‘covenant’ that supports the scheme. Also 
the government did not intend to hasten the closure of DB schemes by making them unduly 
onerous.4  
 The demise of DB schemes is widely viewed as damaging to the interests of employees. 
The norm is now to offer only a defined-contribution (DC) scheme, under which the employer 
provides a specific level of contribution rather than benefit. The shift to DC transfers risk from 
the employer to the employee, who is typically less able to understand and manage that risk. 
To date the shift has been accompanied by greatly reduced contributions, and therefore lower 
future pensions.5 
 Similar trends of underfunding and closure of DB schemes apply in other developed 
countries. Private-sector DB schemes had a funding deficit on average in almost all countries 
by the 2000s (Bartram, 2016, 2017). UK schemes are relatively large, measured by the present 
value of pension obligations divided by company assets, and they have relatively large deficits. 
Hence, the UK is a promising setting in which to study how the demands of DB schemes affect 
the behaviour of company sponsors. 
 
2.2 Previous research 
 Pension contributions. Several papers examine the impact of contributions on company 
behaviour. Rauh (2006) regresses capital expenditure (capex) and dividend on mandatory 
contribution for US firms. He finds a large and statistically significant negative relation 
                                                 
4 But see Harrison et al. (2005) for views from practitioners that the 2004 Act did make closure more likely. See 
CIMA (2008), Pensions Regulator (2014), and Thurley (2008, 2017) for more detail on regulation after 2004. 
5 The average contribution rate for private-sector DB (DC) schemes in 2016 was 22.7% (4.2%) of pensionable 
earnings, split 5.8% (1.0%) from members and 16.9% (3.2%) from employers (Office for National Statistics, 
2017). 
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between capex and contribution, and a negative relation between dividend and mandatory 
contribution, though it is significant only in Tobit specifications. Rauh’s argument that the 
relation is causal is based on the presence of discontinuities in the function by which a scheme’s 
funding status determines the firm’s mandatory contributions.  
 However, Bakke and Whited (2012) question Rauh’s identification strategy. They 
argue that his research design does not ensure that all endogeneity between contributions and 
investment opportunities is eliminated. They show that his results are due to a small subset of 
companies which have severely underfunded pension schemes and high mandatory 
contributions, and which also face more financial constraint than other sample companies. 
Financial constraint could cause both underfunding of the scheme and relatively low capex. 
They find no evidence for an effect of contribution on either capex or dividend using a 
regression discontinuity design, though they do find that firms with funding level just below a 
given threshold have lower accounts receivable and higher cash flow, compared with firms just 
above the threshold. Bakke and Whited suggest that firms fund increases in mandatory 
contribution by managing receivables to release cash. 
 For the UK, Bunn and Trivedi (2005) estimate the relations between capex and regular 
dividend, and pension contribution. Their contribution variable is the pension cost shown in 
company accounts up to 2003, which was a smoothed version of the cash contribution. They 
find that dividend is negatively related to pension cost, significant at the 5% or 10% level. 
Capex is also negatively related to pension cost, but the relation is barely significant.  
 Liu and Tonks (2013) conduct a similar study, for the period 2002-07. The UK 
regulatory regime for contributions does not have strict funding thresholds, in contrast to the 
US regime. But Liu and Tonks argue that the Pensions Act 2004 implies that henceforth 
‘mandatory pension contributions are exogenous and cannot be manipulated by managers’ (p. 
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236).6 In regressions estimated by GMM, with regular dividend as the dependent variable, 
contribution is mostly significant at the 5% level or better, though not consistently so. While 
Bunn and Trivedi find that one pound of pension contribution is associated with a fall in 
dividend of 16 pence, the impact in Liu and Tonks is an order of magnitude higher, at £1.30 
(or more). They conclude that there is a ‘strong and negative relation between pension 
contributions and corporate dividend payments’ (p. 237). A contemporaneous study by Bunn, 
Mizen and Smietanka (2018) uses data from the regulator (not publicly available) and confirms 
a negative relation between dividend and DRC, though it is only marginally significant. 
 We also note the literature which explores links in the other direction, i.e. how a 
company affects its pension scheme, as opposed to how the scheme affects the company. Of 
most relevance is the recent evidence of Bartram (2017, 2018) on the determinants of pension 
contributions in the USA and internationally. He finds that characteristics of the scheme, such 
as funding status, are the most important determinants, but that the financial health of the 
sponsor also matters. The size of contributions is related to the sponsor’s cash flow (also 
reported for the USA by Ballester, Fried and Livnat, 2002), capex, cash holdings, leverage and 
Z-score, in the directions expected a priori. This evidence implies that firms have some 
discretion over the timing and amounts of their contributions.7 
 Cuts in dividends. Given most existing research on dividend policy, a large impact of 
contributions on dividends would be quite surprising. Reluctance of listed firms to cut their 
regular dividends is an established stylised fact. The most common reason for a cut in DPS is 
that the firm has made a loss, or suffered a large fall in operating profit (DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Skinner, 1992; Lie, 2005; Bulan, 2010. For the UK, Benito and Young, 2003; Michaely 
                                                 
6 Similarly, Kiosse and Peasnell (2009, p. 257), reviewing whether accounting changes explain DB closures, 
remark that ‘the major drawback of DB schemes nowadays is that they expose the employer to volatile demands 
for cash injections’. 
7 Discretion on the part of sponsors is assumed by theories about how a company determines its amounts of 
contribution, and the funding level it prefers. See Sutcliffe (2016, pp. 221-39) and Bartram (2018).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071842 
10 
 
and Roberts, 2012). We expect it to be unusual for a UK firm to cut DPS in response to a large 
cash expenditure (such as a DRC), if the expenditure is not accompanied by substantially lower 
profit.8  
 
3. Pension costs and sample 
3.1 Reporting of pension expense and contribution 
 Our sample period is 2003-16. We start in 2003 because this was the first full year in 
which pension disclosure was governed by Financial Reporting Standard 17, which replaced 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24.9 The pension note to the accounts contains 
much more information than before and includes for the first time the (unsmoothed) cash 
contribution to the pension fund, and the service cost. These data items enable a more precise 
estimate to be made of DRCs than was previously possible. Other major changes in reporting 
were recognition of the scheme surplus (deficit) as an asset (liability) on the balance sheet, and 
inclusion of the actuarial gain or loss for the year in the statement of recognised income and 
expense. 
 Contributions are cash outflows that differ from the pension expense that is charged to 
operating profit. The reported pension expense of a DB scheme for a given year is: 
 Pension expense  =  Service cost  +  (Interest cost – Expected gain on scheme assets) 
   (1) 
where Service cost is the present value of the additional benefits accrued by active (non-retired) 
scheme members during the year,10 Interest cost is the increase in the present value of the 
                                                 
8 Our data support the expectation of few dividend cuts in response to negative cash flow (measured before 
dividends, repurchases and financing) without lower profit. There are 214 firm-years where (i) DPSt–1 > 0, so a 
cut is possible, (ii) EPSt > EPSt–1 > 0, but (iii) Cashflowt/Assetst–1 < –5%. DPS is cut or omitted in only 6.1% of 
these cases. Even setting Cashflowt/Assetst–1 < –20%, DPS is cut in only 8.0% of cases. 
9 Companies could report using both SSAP 24 and FRS 17 side-by-side, until 2005.  
10 The contribution from employees is part of staff costs, not the company’s contribution. It is treated as creating 
benefits, of the same value as the contribution, that are not part of service cost. 
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scheme’s obligations due to discounting over a period that is one year shorter, and Expected 
gain on scheme assets is the assumed expected return on the scheme’s assets times their value 
at the start of the year. The contribution rather than pension expense is charged against taxable 
profit (HMRC, 2015), and this provides an incentive to pay contributions in years when they 
can be fully set against taxable profits. 
 The relation between pension expense and cash contribution can be explained as 
follows (Accounting Standards Board, 2000, Appendix 1 is helpful). Consider a scheme in a 
stable state; it is fully funded, and the interest cost and expected gain on scheme assets are 
approximately equal. Service cost will be positive if the scheme is open to any future accrual 
of benefits, and zero if it is fully closed, i.e. closed to new members and frozen to existing 
members, so that no additional benefits accrue. We would expect the sponsor to make an annual 
contribution roughly equal to the service cost, if any, to maintain full funding of the scheme. 
Note that cash payments of pension benefits reduce both assets and liabilities equally. 
 If the scheme falls into deficit in a given year, this implies one or more of the following: 
(i) there has been an increase in expected obligations, beyond the increase reflected in service 
cost, e.g. because of increasing longevity, (ii) the discount rate on expected obligations has 
been reduced, or (iii) the actual gain on the scheme’s assets has been lower than the expected 
gain. (i) and (ii) imply an increase in interest cost; (iii) might imply a reduction in the assumed 
expected gain on assets. Thus, a growing deficit implies a growing pension expense, through 
higher interest cost or lower expected return on assets. The sponsor of a scheme in deficit is 
likely to start making contributions that exceed service cost, in order to reduce the deficit. But 
there is no direct accounting relation between pension expense and contribution, and in practice 
their values can be quite different. For example, BT Group plc for 2016 reported service cost 
of £301m, interest cost of £1,627m and expected gain on assets of £1,406m, giving a pension 
expense of £522m. The cash contribution was £1,106m. 
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 We view the portion of a contribution that exceeds service cost as a payment made in 
order to reduce a scheme deficit. It is the deficit-reducing component (if any) that is potentially 
a cash flow shock for the company: 
 DRC  =  Contribution  –  Service cost (2) 
DRC can be negative under this definition. Any contributions made after full closure of a 
scheme are entirely DRCs. 
 
3.2 Sample 
 Our sample consists of operating companies with a DB scheme in the FTSE All-Share 
index. This includes all large and medium-sized UK companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.11 The number of operating companies in the index is 555 in 2003, falling to 417 in 
2016. Of these, 476 have a DB scheme in 2003, and 321 in 2016, including firm-years in which 
the DB scheme is fully closed but the company remains the sponsor. We exclude financial 
companies, and companies that do not report contribution data or have missing dividend or 
repurchase data. Our final sample consists of 342 companies in 2003, falling to 239 in 2016. 
 Pension and accounting data are from Worldscope, except for contribution (not 
provided) and service cost (often missing). These data are available from Bloomberg for 61% 
of sample companies in 2003, decreasing in later years (Bloomberg often records service cost 
after a scheme closes as not available rather than zero). We hand-collect missing contribution 
and service-cost data from annual reports. The contribution and other pension data are 
consolidated amounts in cases where the company has more than one scheme, and the 
consolidation includes schemes of overseas subsidiaries (confirmed for Worldscope and 
Bloomberg data by checks in annual reports). 
                                                 
11 Most foreign-registered companies listed on the LSE are not in the index because their shares are traded by 
means of Global Depository Receipts, which are not eligible. About 6% of our sample are foreign-registered but 
have their shares listed, and therefore qualify. Most are registered in Jersey, Ireland or Bermuda. We view these 
as UK companies which are registered abroad for tax reasons. The results are unaffected if they are excluded. 
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Table 1 around here 
  
 Table 1 shows annual summary data on scheme characteristics. The Appendix contains 
definitions of all variables. Overall, the problem of pension deficits eases a little during the 
sample period. Ninety-four per cent of schemes are in deficit in 2003, falling slightly to 83% 
by 2016. The average scheme deficit increases in money terms, but declines as a proportion of 
assets, from 9.8% to 5.4%. We scale throughout by the firm’s assets as at the end of its previous 
financial year, Assetst–1, in order to avoid potential inflation of scaled DRC if a large DRC 
reduces Assetst (Rauh, 2006, likewise scales by Assetst–1). Average Service costt/Assetst–1 
declines sharply, from 1.0% to 0.3%, reflecting scheme closures. Average DRCt/Assetst–1 
increases from 0.1% in 2003 to between 0.7% and 1.0%. The maximum DRC is 31.7% and the 
minimum is –15.7%.12 The average contribution (= service cost + DRC) increases from £25m 
to £56m in money terms, but as a proportion of assets the peak is 1.8% in 2007, with a decline 
thereafter to 1.0% in 2016. The annual medians (not shown) exhibit similar trends but are 
smaller than the means, especially in money terms, because of skewed distributions. For the 
whole sample period, the mean (median) pension deficit is £167m (£22m) or 6.5% (3.6%) of 
Assetst–1. The mean contribution is 1.3% (0.8%), and DRC is 0.7% (0.3%). 
 
4. Dividends and forecast dividends 
4.1 Forecasts from the Lintner model 
                                                 
12 We made many checks of large DRCs. The resulting changes are as follows. (i) Delete one firm-year, Melrose 
Industries plc, 2005. This firm-year has extreme values for several variables, including DRC of 43.8%. The 
company made a huge acquisition during the year in relation to its existing size. (ii) Count a very large DRC by 
Uniq plc as made in 2007, when the cash was paid into a restricted account, rather than 2010 when the cash was 
released into the pension fund. (iii) Correct DRCs for BT Group plc, severely understated in Bloomberg for several 
years. (iv) Correct a huge error in service cost for Morgan Advanced Material plc, 2005. 
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 The Lintner (1956) model is widely used by researchers as a model for how DPS is 
determined, and we use it to forecast a company’s DPS. The model is: 
 DPSt  =  aT(EPSt)  +  (1 – a)DPSt1  
or DPSt  =  DPSt  –  DPSt1  =  aT(EPSt)  –  aDPSt1  (3) 
where DPSt = regular DPS, EPSt = earnings (net income) per share, T = target payout ratio and 
a = speed of adjustment to target. We follow Fama and Babiak (1968) and Leary and Michaely 
(LM, 2011) in estimating the model on a per-share basis, in the belief that managers focus on 
DPS rather than the amount of dividend. We estimate T and a in two ways. First, T is estimated 
by –β1/β2, and a by –β2 in the following firm-specific time-series regression: 
 DPSt  =  α  +  β1EPSt  +  β2DPSt1  +  et (4) 
We call (4) the standard method of estimating T and a. Forecast DPSt is 
 𝐷𝑃𝑆?̂?  =  max[β1(EPSt) + (1 + β2)DPSt1, 0] (5) 
Fama and Babiak (1968) investigate alternative specifications and find that none provides 
materially more accurate forecasts. More recent studies that use the standard method to forecast 
DPS include Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2008).  
 LM (2011) show by simulation that there is a serious small-sample bias in estimates 
from the regression in (4) that use ten or fewer observations, as in our case. When true speed 
of adjustment (a) is low, estimated speed of adjustment (–β2) is overstated. We follow LM and 
estimate target payout ratio as the firm’s median payout ratio (τ) over time, and speed of 
adjustment by β in 
 DPSt  =  α  +  β(Deviationt)  +  et  (5) 
where Deviationt  =  τ(EPSt) – DPSt1. We call (5) the LM method.  
 For each firm-year we calculate 
 Forecast errort  =  [DPSt – 𝐷𝑃𝑆?̂?]/Assets per sharet1 (7) 
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with 𝐷𝑃𝑆?̂? estimated by each of the two methods. The root mean squared forecast error from 
(7) is 1.57% using the standard method and 1.23% using the LM method, thus we confirm that 
the latter improves the forecasting accuracy of the Linter model. 
 Though the Lintner model was developed to explain regular dividends, Skinner (2008) 
and LM (2011) find that the estimates of β1 and β2 are larger and more statistically significant 
for total payout than for regular dividend, using US data from recent decades. Andres et al. 
(2015) report similar results for Germany. These authors infer that the Lintner model now 
explains total payout better than regular dividend. Given the success of the model in explaining 
total payout, we also use it to estimate forecasts of total payout. In equations (4) to (7), DPS is 
replaced by payout per share, the sum of regular and special DPS, and repurchases per share. 
 
4.2 Dividend data 
 Amounts of regular and special DPS declared are from the London Share Price 
Database (LSPD). We use LSPD because checks against annual reports show that LSPD is 
more reliable than Worldscope, especially for special dividends. The regular DPS for a 
financial year is the sum of the interim and final dividend declared, rather than paid, except in 
the analysis using cash flows in Section 5.4. DPS declared is preferable for our purpose, as it 
measures more accurately any response to a DRC in a given financial year. In particular, if a 
company pays a large DRC and cuts its final dividend in the same year, the effect of the cut is 
seen in the same year using dividend declared. Repurchase data are from Worldscope (LSPD 
does not include repurchases). We adjust all per-share data for capital actions (see Appendix). 
 From 1996 some companies choose to pay special dividends by means of a B-share 
scheme or a court-approved capital reduction.13 There are 59 cases for our sample companies, 
                                                 
13 Under a B-share scheme, a company issues redeemable shares pro rata to existing shareholders, and buys them 
back shortly afterwards. Under a capital reduction, shareholders receive shares in a new company that owns the 
existing group, plus a cash payment. These schemes are special dividends rather than repurchases, because each 
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with a total paid out of £32.7bn. LSPD does not have a comprehensive record of payouts via 
these methods, and Worldscope classifies some of them as repurchases. We identify them by 
means of word searches (‘B-share’, ‘capital reduction’, ‘return of capital’) of Regulatory News 
Service announcements, followed by checks in annual reports. We record each payout as the 
amount declared, for the financial year that gives rise to the declaration, as for a normal special 
dividend. We remove it if necessary from the repurchase data. 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
 Table 2 shows summary statistics for regular DPS and total payout per share. Using 
EPS as the denominator, the mean (median) payout ratio is 66% (45%) for regular dividend, 
and 90% (54%) for total payout. Using assets per share as the denominator, the payout ratio is 
2.9% (2.5%) for dividend, and 4.1% (2.8%) for payout. The proportion of companies that do 
not pay a regular dividend is 11% in both 2003 and 2016 (not shown), so there is no tendency 
during the sample period for the proportion of non-payers to increase. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 DRCs and forecast dividends 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
 Section 5.1 presents results on the relation between dividend forecast error and DRC. 
If companies reduce dividend or payout in order to help fund DRC, we expect forecast error to 
                                                 
of the company’s ordinary shares is entitled to the same cash payout. The schemes enable the payout to be taxed 
as capital gain rather than income. See Oswald and Young (2008) for the schemes’ early years. 
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be negatively related to DRCt/Assetst–1. Special dividends and repurchases are known to be 
more flexible than regular dividends, so we expect total payout to be more sensitive to DRC. 
It is easier for a company paying a large DRC to decline to pay a special dividend or make a 
repurchase, than to cut regular DPS. 
 Table 3 presents mean forecast errors by quartile and sub-quartile of DRCt/Assetst–1. 
Forecast errors are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The results using either method 
of estimation are qualitatively similar; we focus on the LM forecasts because they are more 
accurate. For DPS, the mean forecast error is positive but close to zero for the first three 
quartiles, i.e. observed DPS exceeds the forecast. Quartile 4 (Q4), with the largest DRCs, has 
a minimum DRC of 0.94% and a mean of 2.52%. The mean forecast error for Q4 is –0.31%, 
which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and from the mean error for Q1. 
However, this shortfall is small in relation to forecast DPS. The mean forecast for Q4 is 3.49% 
(DPSt/Assets per sharet–1 of 3.18% plus the forecast error of 0.31%), so the mean DPS shortfall 
is 0.31%/3.49% = 8.9% of the mean forecast.  
 Table 3 also shows results for sub-quartiles within quartile 4. The largest negative errors 
are concentrated in firm-years with the largest DRCs. Q4.4 has a minimum DRC of 2.66% and 
a mean of 5.18%. The mean forecast error is –0.78%, significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. This shortfall is 17.9% of the mean forecast. The shortfalls for Q4.3 and Q4.2 are 
much smaller, and less significant. While Q4.4 has the most negative forecast error, it also has 
a high mean for DPSt/Assets per sharet–1 of 3.57%, which exceeds the mean dividend/assets 
ratio for any other quartile or sub-quartile. 
 The results for total payout per share show more impact of DRC on total payout than 
on regular dividend, as expected. The mean LM error in Q4 is –1.20%, compared with –0.31% 
for DPS, and this shortfall is 20.3% of the forecast total payout. There is a strong progression 
of mean error within Q4, as for DPS. The shortfall for Q4.4 is large at –2.70%, significant at 
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the 1% level, and represents 31.9% of forecast payout. Yet mean Payoutt/Assetst–1 for Q4.4 is 
5.76%, the highest for any quartile or sub-quartile. So despite the payout shortfall in Q4.4, high 
DRC is associated with high actual total payout on average, as for DPS. 
 Median forecast errors are not shown to conserve space, but they confirm the point that 
only the largest DRCs have an impact. For both regular DPS and total payout, only the negative 
medians for Q4.4 are significantly different from zero (at the 5% level).14 
 Overall, there is evidence of a small negative impact of DRC on DPS compared with 
its forecast. This is mostly confined to large DRCs, in Q4.4, in which the mean DRC is 5.2% 
of assets. For total payout, the mean forecast errors in Q4.1 to Q4.4 are more negative than for 
DPS, but only the shortfall in Q4.4 is significant at the 1% level. 
 The evidence in Tables 1 to 3 does not require any accounting data apart from net 
income and assets. We are therefore able to produce these tables for a FTSE All-Share sample 
that includes financial companies (but not investment vehicles). This increases the total number 
of firm-years by nearly 17%. We can confirm that all the evidence for the larger sample is 
similar to that reported above. 
 
5.2 DRCs and dividend cuts  
 This section examines whether large DRCs are associated specifically with DPS cuts 
or omissions, after allowing for instances that can be explained by reasons other than a large 
DRC. Sufficient reasons for a cut include (i) the firm has made a loss or (ii) suffered a large 
decline in profit (DeAngelo et al., 1992), or (iii) opted for a more flexible payout for dividends 
and poor profits (Skinner, 2008), or (iv) sold a large part of its business. The latter is clearly a 
reason for cutting DPS, because the group’s profit-generating base is lower. If any of (i) to (iv) 
                                                 
14 We also calculate forecast errors using a ‘sticky dividend’ forecast of no change in DPS, or total payout, as in 
Daniel et al. (2008). The mean forecast errors using this method are positive and significantly different from zero 
for all quartiles and sub-quartiles. They show no significant relation with DRC. 
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apply, the primary reason for the dividend cut or omission is unlikely to be a DRC. Our proxies 
for the above reasons are (i) EPS is negative in year t – 1 or t, (ii) EPS falls by more than 50% 
in year t, (iii) DPS is cut in year t but total payout per share exceeds DPS in year t – 1, or DPS 
in both year t – 1 and t is zero but payout exceeds 3% of Assetst–1 in year t, and (iv) the firm 
makes a disposal of at least 30% of Assetst–1 in year t – 1 or t. If a DRC is a reason for a dividend 
cut or omission, we expect the proportion of firm-years with a cut or omission not explained 
by (i) to (iv), and therefore potentially explained by a DRC, to be positively related to DRC. 
Our sample is firms with an LM forecast, to exclude firms that never pay a dividend, and to 
assess the impact of excluding cuts and omissions on forecast errors. 
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 around here 
 
 Table 4 shows that in Q1 and Q2 combined, the proportion of firm-years with a cut or 
omission in DPS is 16.0%, of which the cut or omission is not explained by reasons (i) to (iv) 
in 19.7% of cases. DRC is either positive or clearly too small to be the reason in these cases, 
so there is a residue of almost 20% of cuts and omissions that are unexplained even when DRC 
has no role. The proportion of firm-years with a cut or omission increases somewhat with DRC, 
rising to 22.0% in Q4 and 25.2% in Q4.4. But there is no sign that DRC on its own has a role 
in explaining the higher proportion of cuts and omissions in Q4, except in Q4.4. The 
unexplained proportion in Q4 is slightly lower than in Q1+2, and there is no clear trend within 
Q4. For Q4.4, the unexplained proportion is 29.7%, 10 percentage points above Q1+2 and 15.4 
points above Q4.1. This suggests the existence of a few cases in which a large DRC is the 
primary reason for a cut or omission (the sample of all cuts and omissions in Q4.4 is only 37 
firm-years). A further point is that the proportion of cuts and omissions explained by disposals 
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is higher in Q4 at 9.2%, compared with 2.2% for Q1+2. Some of the disposals by companies 
with high DRC might have been made in order to pay the DRC.15  
 The results in Table 4 indicate that one of the reasons for the negative forecast errors in 
Q4 in Table 3 is indeed a higher proportion of firm-years with reduced or zero DPS than in the 
other quartiles. However, high DRC is not the primary reason for most cuts and omissions, 
even when DRC large. Most companies that pay a high DRC, and cut or omit their dividend, 
have a sufficient identifiable reason for doing so that is other than the large DRC. 
 We also investigate the relation between dividend cuts and DRC using logit regressions, 
where the dependent variable = 1 if DPS is reduced or zero, and zero otherwise. The 
explanatory variables include DRC and dummy variables representing reasons (i) to (iv) above 
for reduced or zero dividend. One specification also includes Net incomet/Assetst–1 and ∆Net 
incomet/Assetst–1, following the studies of dividend cuts by DeAngelo et al. (1992) and 
Goergen, Correia da Silva and Renneboog (2005). The results are in Table 5. DRC is 
marginally significant, at the 10% level, or at the 5% level when net income and change in net 
income are included as control variables. All the control variables except the disposals dummy 
have the signs expected and are highly significant. The results are similar for the full sample 
(not shown), instead of the sample with an LM forecast, except that DRC is not significant in 
any specification. The results in Table 5 confirm that DRC is not on its own an important reason 
for a dividend cut, but they suggest that DRC has some explanatory power controlling for 
profitability. 
 The above evidence implies that some of the impact of DRC on DPS detected in Table 
3 is spurious. However DRCs might have an effect independent of cuts and omissions if they 
cause restraint to DPS increases. In Table 6 we examine this possibility by excluding cuts and 
                                                 
15 We run multivariate regressions with forecast error as the dependent variable, as in Grullon and Michaely 
(2002). DRC is significant at the 5% level (forecasts from LM method), or not significant (forecasts from standard 
method). We do not report these regressions as there is a clear endogeneity problem: profitability affects both 
forecasts and return on assets, a control variable. 
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omissions, and re-examining forecast error by DRC (sub-)quartile. The mean LM error for Q4 
is 0.05%, compared with 0.30% for Q1, and the difference significant at the 1% level. The 
mean error for Q4.4 is –0.20%. These differences suggest restraint in increasing DPS, in 
relation to Lintner-model forecast DPS, when companies pay large DRCs. Possible restraint in 
increasing DPS accounts for 0.22 percentage points of the 0.41 point difference between Q1 
and Q4 in Table 3, and for 0.40 points of the 0.89 point difference between Q1 and Q4.4.16  
 
5.3  Regression analysis 
 
Tables 7 and 8 around here 
 
 We go on to provide further estimates of the impact of DRC on payout, by means of 
regressions using panel data, following the methods of previous papers reviewed in Section 
2.2. Table 7 shows results for regressions with variables and specifications similar to those in 
Rauh (2006, Table 4), except that our contribution variable is DRC rather than mandatory 
contribution: 
 Divit/Assetsi,t1  = β1DRCit/Assetsi,t1  +  β2Qi,t1  +  β3NonpenCFit/Assetsi,t–1 
  +  β4Fundingit/Assetsi,t–1  +  αi  +  αt  +  eit (8) 
where Divit is regular dividend declared by firm i, Qi,t1 is Tobin’s Q as at the end of year t – 1, 
NonpenCFit is the firm’s cash flow from operations plus pension contribution, Fundingit is 
pension-fund assets minus liabilities, and αi and αt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. 
All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Since dividend and payout have a 
floor of zero, we estimate equation (8) using Tobit and industry fixed effects, as well as by 
                                                 
16 Average forecast error due to firm-years with no cut or omission = Av(Error)Nnocut/N, where N the total number 
of firm-years in the quartile. 
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OLS. If DRC reduces payout, the coefficient on DRC should be negative. We expect the 
coefficients on NonpenCF and Funding to be positive: companies with higher cash flow are 
likely to pay higher dividends; Funding is likely to be positively related to the sponsor’s 
profitability (Bartram, 2018), and more profitable companies pay higher dividends. The 
expected sign on Q is uncertain. Q could serve as another proxy for profitability, in which case 
its sign should be positive, or Q could proxy for investment opportunities and demand for 
capital expenditure, in which case its sign could be negative. The coefficients on Q are positive 
and significant in Rauh (2006).  
 The key result is that the coefficient on DRC is negative but not statistically significant 
using either OLS or Tobit.17 We discuss this below, after the results for GMM regressions. 
NonpenCF and Funding have a positive sign, as expected. NonpenCF is highly significant, and 
Funding is significant at the 5% level using Tobit.18 Q also turns out to be positive and highly 
significant. The results are similar with total payout as the dependent variable, with no 
significant relation between payout and DRC (surprisingly the sign on DRC is positive). Both 
Q and Cashflow have larger and more significant coefficients than with dividend as the 
dependent variable, consistent with total payout being more responsive than regular dividend 
to profitability (e.g. Skinner, 2008). 
 The model in (8) is mis-specified in that it omits the previous year’s dividend, which 
we know to be strongly related to the current year’s dividend because dividends are smoothed 
over time. In a model with a lagged dependent variable and firm fixed effects, OLS produces 
biased estimates of the lag coefficient. This stems from the de-meaning when controlling for 
                                                 
17 We report significance using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm. DRC is 
significant at the 5% level under both OLS and Tobit using standard errors without these corrections. Controlling 
for clustering of errors by firm has heightened importance under a Tobit specification, because use of firm fixed 
effects is not possible. To the extent that the firm fixed effect remains in the residual, ignoring autocorrelation at 
the firm level materially understates the standard errors. 
18 Bunn et al. (2018) note that companies face exogenous shocks to DB funding status. For example, lower gilt 
yields imply a higher present value of pension liabilities. They interpret the positive relation between funding and 
dividend as evidence that companies respond to deficits by paying lower dividends. An alternative view is that 
funding and dividend are expected to be related through being correlated with profitability. 
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firm fixed effects, whereby any shock to the dependent variable affects both the de-meaned 
lagged dependent variable and the de-meaned error term. To alleviate this problem, researchers 
often use the two-step system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) (see also Wintocki, Linck and Netter, 2012). This approach uses 
first differences to control for fixed effects while simultaneously instrumenting for differenced 
lags of the dependent variable using both deeper lags of variable levels as well as lags of the 
differences themselves. The approach is applied by Bunn and Trivedi (2005) and Liu and Tonks 
(2013). Following these authors, the GMM regressions we estimate are19  
 Divit/Assetsi,t1  = β1Divit–1/Assetsi,t–2  +  β2DRCit/Assetsi,t1  +  β3Qi,t1  + 
  β4NonpenCFit/Assetsi,t–1  +  β5Fundingit/Assetsi,t–1  + 
  β6Debtit/Assetsi,t–1 +  β7Capexit/Assetsi,t–1  +  αi  +  αt  +  eit (9) 
All explanatory variables with the exception of the year dummies are treated as potentially 
endogenous and are instrumented using GMM-style instruments, as explained above, from lag-
length 3 to lag-length 4. Year dummies are considered strictly exogenous. Instrument lags are 
collapsed in order to avoid proliferation of weak instruments. We also calculate results with 
two lags of the dependent variable included on the right-hand side. The dependent variable 
lagged twice is not significant, so we do not report these results. 
 To ensure robust application of the system GMM method, we examine four diagnostic 
tests. First, we expect by construction significant negative first-order autocorrelation in the 
errors, owing to the first differencing inherent in the GMM approach. There should not be 
significant second-order autocorrelation, if the model is properly specified. We implement a 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that all instruments are valid. Finally, 
we run difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity, under the null that instruments used for the 
                                                 
19 Our regressions include the same set of explanatory variables, but they are not identical. Bunn and Trivedi scale 
dividends and pension cost by sales rather than assets, and Liu and Tonks scale all their variables by Assetst rather 
than Assetst–1. In addition, contribution and some of the control variables are measured differently. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071842 
24 
 
equations in levels are exogenous. All the test statistics are in the range for us to conclude that 
our models are appropriately specified and that the instruments have sufficient strength and 
exogeneity. 
 Table 8 shows the results of the GMM regressions. The lagged value of dividend has a 
large coefficient of 0.83 that is highly significant, as expected. Serial correlation of the 
dependent variable is lower for total payout, as expected given that it includes special dividends 
and repurchases which are more variable over time than regular dividends. DRC is not 
significant and has a positive sign (not expected) with payout as the dependent variable. The 
lack of explanatory power for DRC is consistent with the OLS and Tobit regression results in 
Table 7. The control variables have the signs expected, though some are not significant. 
 The results using Lintner-model forecasts show some effect of DRC on payout, whereas 
the regression results do not. This inconsistency could arise because of a fundamental 
difference between the two approaches. The Lintner approach involves estimates of 
coefficients on EPS and lagged DPS that are specific to each firm. Regression uses data on all 
firms together, and estimates single representative relations between payout and DRC, profit 
and the other explanatory variables, that are the same across all firms. 
 The GMM results for the impact of DRC on dividend differ from those in Bunn and 
Trivedi (2005) and Liu and Tonks (2013). Both papers report coefficients on their contribution 
variables that are significant at the 5% level, or sometimes better in Liu and Tonks. Comparison 
of our results with those in Bunn and Trivedi suggests that the impact of pension contributions 
on dividends might have become less following the Pensions Act 2004. The Pensions Regulator 
could in practice have enabled firms to negotiate more easily, with regard to the timing of 
contributions, than was the case before 2004 under the Minimum Funding Requirement. We 
also note that GMM results are rather sensitive to the specification of the regression, as 
discussed for example by Baum (2013). The coefficients are large in Liu and Tonks, ranging 
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between –1.3 and –11.8. Their low-end estimates imply that ‘the effect of a £1 increase in total 
PCs [pension contributions] is to reduce dividends by between £1.32 and £1.52’ (p. 256). This 
seems a priori to be an extraordinarily large impact, and it is an order of magnitude larger than 
Bunn and Trivedi estimate. 
 Bunn et al. (2018) use non-public data from the Pensions Regulator on recovery plans, 
including DRCs which they describe as mandatory, though they note that companies have 
discretion regarding the timing of DRCs (their note 13). Their sample period is 2011-15. They 
estimate the impact of DRC on dividend via Tobit regressions similar to those reported in the 
last two columns of Table 7. Their DRC variable has a negative coefficient significant at the 
10% level (their Table 4, column 4). The significance of DRC is marginal and could be due to 
how they calculate standard errors. We find that, in regression model (7) estimated using Tobit, 
DRC becomes significant at the 5% level without controlling for clustering of errors by firm. 
But we believe it is correct to control for clustering of errors by firm (note 17).   
 Results for capex. Tables 7 and 8 include results with capex as the dependent variable. 
Using OLS regression, DRC has a coefficient of –0.14, significant at the 5% level. This is 
consistent with US evidence, though the relation is weaker. Using GMM, and including one 
lag of Capext/Assetst–1 in the right-hand side, the coefficient on DRC is negative but not close 
to significance. The negative sign on Funding is unexpected. Neither Bunn and Trivedi (2005) 
nor Liu and Tonks (2013) find a robust and significant negative relation between capex and 
pension cost or DRC, using GMM. Our results are therefore similar to theirs with respect to 
company investment. But Bunn et al. (2018) using GMM do find a significant negative relation 
between capex and DRC. 
 
5.4 Funding of DRCs 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071842 
26 
 
 The above results indicate that few DRCs are funded by reducing regular dividend or 
total payout, and the relation with capex is weak. This raises the question of how companies 
actually fund their large contributions. To help provide an answer, we regress DRC on 
components of cash flow. It could be that higher DRCs are paid in years with higher cash flow, 
or when the company raises external debt or equity. Bakke and Whited (2012) suggest that US 
companies fund increased contributions by managing working capital.  
 The net cash flow to be financed in a given firm-year can be analysed as: 
 NetCF  = NonpenCF – DRC – Capex – Acq – ∆Workingcap + Disposal – Divpaid  
  + OtherCF (10) 
where OtherCF is all other cash flows and Divpaid is regular dividends paid rather than 
declared (other variables are defined in the Appendix). NetCF must be equal to the change in 
cash holdings, plus change in debt, plus cash raised from share issues, net of any flexible 
payouts via special dividends and repurchases: 
 NetCF  =  Cash – (Debt + Share issue – Specialdivpaid – Repurchase) (11) 
A positive value for Debt or Share issue means cash is raised from lenders or investors, 
respectively. The relations between DRC and the components of cash flow and financing will 
help reveal how companies tend to fund DRC. 
 
Table 9 around here 
 
 Table 9 shows the results of regressions with firm fixed effects, in which the dependent 
variable is DRCt/Assetst–1. In models 1 and 2 the explanatory variables are components of cash 
flow or variants: dividends declared instead of paid; net income instead of cash flow. 
NonpenCF, with a positive sign, is highly significant and easily has the most explanatory 
power. Most of the other variables also turn out to be significant at the 5% level or more, signed 
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as would be expected a priori: Capex (–), Acq (–), ∆Workingcap (–), Disposal (+), Divpaid    
(–), ∆Cash (–), ∆Debt (+), Share issue (+), and Repurchase (–).20 The results using dividends 
as declared instead of as paid are almost identical. The results suggest that, controlling for other 
variables, companies tend to fund large DRCs by reducing capex, expenditure on acquisitions, 
and regular dividends, avoiding repurchases, raising equity and debt, using cash holdings and 
proceeds from disposals, and reducing working capital. It appears that companies fund DRCs 
by a variety of means.  
 The results change somewhat when Net income is used instead of NonpenCF (models 
3 and 4). Net income itself is statistically significant but has less explanatory power than 
NonpenCF, and of the other variables only Disposal and Repurchase remain significant. These 
results suggest that Capex, Acq, ∆Workingcap, Divpaid, ∆Cash, ∆Debt, and Share issue have 
explanatory power for DRC only conditional on operating cash flow (gross of contribution).  
 Model 5 adds four pension-related variables, namely funding status and pension 
liabilities scaled by Assetst–1, and the expected and actual returns on fund assets. This is closer 
to a full model to explain what determines DRCs. Unfortunately the sample is smaller due to 
missing data in Worldscope. The new variables have the signs expected; funding status and 
liabilities are significant at the 5% level, and actual returns on fund assets is significant at the 
10% level. The additional variables do not make much difference to the results for the cash 
flow variables. 
 Regarding payouts, Divpaid and Div have a negative coefficient which is significant at 
the 5% level controlling for NonpenCF. But the results indicate that several other variables are 
more important in explaining how DRCs are funded. The coefficient on Specialdivpaid is 
positive but not significant, whereas the coefficient on Repurchase is negative and significant 
                                                 
20 The role of disposals in funding DRCs is probably understated, because of a timing problem. Cash received in 
year t from a disposal can be used to fund a large DRC in year t + 1. Alternatively, a large DRC in year t can be 
made in anticipation of receiving cash in t + 1.  
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at the 1% level. So we find that large DRCs are associated with lower repurchases but not lower 
special dividends, controlling for cash flow. The result for dividends and repurchases are 
consistent with the evidence from Lintner forecasts of some effect of DRC on DPS, with the 
effect on total payout per share being greater. 
 The regressions do not show the direction of causality between DRC and the 
explanatory variables, and the direction is likely to differ depending on the variable. Companies 
have limited control over NonpenCF, so it seems more plausible that a company with a high 
operating inflow chooses to make a high DRC, than that a high DRC causes the company to 
have a high operating cash flow. That is, cash flow is largely exogenous with respect to DRC, 
so it is a potential determinant of DRC. Companies have much more control over Repurchase 
and ∆Cash. So it is more plausible that a high DRC can cause a company to spend less on 
repurchases, or to use some of its cash holdings, than that a low repurchase or reduction in cash 
causes the company to pay a large DRC. We also see that DRC is associated with Disposal, 
∆Debt and Share issue. In these cases the causality is ambiguous. For example, a company 
might take the opportunity of an inflow from a large disposal to pay a large DRC, or the 
company might have made the disposal to fund the DRC.  
 The evidence supports an inference that companies have some choice over when to pay 
large contributions. Recovery plans agreed with the regulator afford companies time to raise 
funds, or to wait for years with large inflows. The results are mostly consistent with Bartram 
(2017), who studies the determinants of pension contributions using a large international 
sample. He finds that contributions are positively related to cash flow and negatively related to 
capex, which is consistent with our results. He interprets this as (part of the) evidence that DB 
schemes provide sponsoring firms with financial flexibility, in terms of remuneration of staff. 
Bartram (2018) conducts a similar analysis for a US sample, but using a much larger number 
of explanatory variables, most of which are not cash flow variables. He concludes that ‘pension 
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plan characteristics have, by far, the largest explanatory power’ (p. 19). Surprisingly, gross 
profit margin is barely significant and capex is not significant – but cash flow is not included 
as an explanatory variable in his regression, and our results are sensitive to its inclusion.  
 We note finally that though DRC has a modest impact on current regular dividend or 
payout, a company’s use of funds for DRCs from operating cash flows and other sources 
implies that it will have less cash in future than it would otherwise have. This makes it possible 
that payouts to shareholders will be lower in future than they would otherwise have been.  
 As an important robustness test, we run all the above analyses (Tables 3 to 9) using 
total cash contribution instead of DRC. All the results are very similar, and are not reported 
(they are available on request). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The paper investigates the relation between pension contributions and payouts to 
shareholders in companies listed on the FTSE All-Share index during 2003-16. We find that, 
contrary to expectations, there has been little impact of contributions on regular dividend. The 
impact we detect, using firm-specific Linter-model forecasts of DPS or total payout per share, 
is confined to firm-years with unusually large DRCs. Much of the impact is in the form of 
restraint in increasing DPS or in making repurchases. The incidence of cuts and omissions in 
DPS, that are not explicable by poor profit or another sufficient reason, is little higher in firm-
years with large DRCs. In addition, the evidence for a detectable impact of DRCs is not robust. 
There is no impact measured by means of regressions with dividend or payout scaled by assets 
as the dependent variable. The evidence confirms that pension contributions are not an 
exception to the rule, inferred from much previous research on dividends, that companies cut 
dividends in response to poor profit rather than to cash outflows. 
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 Our analysis of how DRCs are funded offers an explanation for why we find little 
relation between DRC and DPS. Firm-years with large DRCs have larger operating cash flows 
(before pension contribution, capex and payout) and higher net income, compared with other 
firm-years. We infer that companies are able to time when they make large contributions, so 
that most are made in years with healthy cash flows and profits. This enables companies to 
avoid cuts in DPS. Another possible benefit from timing is that it helps in saving corporation 
tax, given that contributions are set against taxable profits. Our evidence is consistent with 
Bartram (2017), who reports a significant positive relation between contribution and cash flow, 
for an international sample, in regressions to explain contribution. 
 This evidence implies that companies with pension deficits are normally given some 
discretion about when and how much they contribute, and that contributions are less of an 
exogenous shock imposed by the Pensions Regulator, and more of an expenditure that the 
company can manage. This is consistent with statements of policy. In cases where the regulator 
gets involved in the setting of contributions, it takes a scheme-specific and long-term view on 
deficit recovery, working with firms to help secure pension benefits alongside other corporate 
policy aims. 
 The closure of DB schemes in the UK over the last 20 years has been justified primarily 
by concern about the scale of pension deficits and the resulting contributions, including 
perceived threats to dividends. Our evidence suggests that some of this concern is misplaced. 
Companies with deficits have been able make increased contributions without much disruption 
to payouts to shareholders.  
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Appendix: definitions of variables 
 
In all cases the variable relates to a firm-year. Numbers in brackets are Worldscope data codes, where applicable. Adjustment for capital actions: LSPD’s daily capital-actions 
file records for each company an adjustment factor for each scrip issue, share consolidation, and scrip element in a rights issue. We multiply the adjustment factors over time 
to obtain a cumulative adjustment factor for any given day. Each regular and special DPS declared is recorded unadjusted by LSPD. 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Acq Cash cost of acquisitions net of cash balances acquired (04355) 
 
Actualrtn Actual return for year on pension-fund assets (18816) 
 
Assets 
 
Total assets (02999) 
Assets per share Total assets/common shares outstanding at financial year-end (05301) adjusted for capital actions 
Capex Capital expenditure (04601 plus 04651) 
 
Cash Cash holdings (02001) 
 
Contribution Cash contribution from company to its pension fund 
 
Debt Total debt outstanding (03051 + 03251 + 18282) 
 
Deficit Pension-fund deficit: Fair (market) value of pension assets (18807) minus Penliabs; a surplus is a negative number 
 
Disposal 
 
Proceeds from sale of fixed assets (04351) 
Div Regular dividend declared: sum of interim and final DPS times number of shares as at month of declaration 
 
Divpaid Regular dividend paid: sum of DPS payments where each payment is multiplied by number of shares as at month of DPS declaration 
 
DPS Regular dividend declared per share: sum of interim and final DPS adjusted for capital actions up to start of month of each declaration 
 
DRC Deficit-reduction contribution: Contribution – Service cost 
 
Expectedrtn Expected long-term return on pension-fund assets (18805) 
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Variable Definition 
 
EPS Earnings (net income) per share (05201) adjusted for capital actions up to financial year-end 
 
Funding Fair (market) value of pension assets (18807) minus projected benefit obligation (18809) 
 
Net income Net income (profits after tax) available to common stockholders (01751)) 
 
NonpenCF Cash flow from operations (04201) plus Contribution 
 
Payout Total payout declared: Div plus special DPS declared times number of shares as at month of declaration plus Repurchase 
 
Payout per 
share 
DPS plus special dividend declared per share adjusted for capital actions up to start of month of declaration, plus Repurchase divided by adjusted 
number of shares as at financial year-end; includes payouts under special schemes 
 
Penliabs Pension-fund liabilities: projected benefit obligation (18809), i.e. reported present value of future obligations 
 
Q (Assets plus market value of equity (08002) minus shareholder equity (03501))/Assets 
 
Repurchase Cash spent on stock purchased or redeemed (04751). We subtract any reduction in preference shares outstanding in the relevant year, and exclude 
payouts under special schemes: if repurchase recorded > 1.1 × special payout, we subtract the payout and treat the remainder as a repurchase; if 
repurchase < 0.9 × payout, we leave the amount as it is; otherwise we treat the repurchase as misclassified and set it to zero.  
 
Sales Net sales or revenues (01001) 
 
Service cost Current service cost of pension fund (18811); present value of additional benefits accrued by active scheme members. We do not include any ‘past 
service cost’ or other adjustments to service cost for relevant year (which are therefore included in DRC). 
 
Share issue Proceeds from issue of common and preferred stock net of costs of issue  (04251) 
 
Specialdiv Special dividend declared: special DPS declared times number of shares at start of month of declaration; includes payouts under special schemes 
 
Specialdivpaid Special dividend paid: special DPS paid times number of shares at start of month of declaration; includes payouts under special schemes 
 
Workingcap Accounts receivable (02051) plus inventories (02101) minus accounts payable (03040) 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071842 
33 
 
 
Table 1 
Pension data by sample year 
 
The sample consists of non-financial operating companies in the FTSE All-Share index which sponsor a DB pension scheme and have requisite 
data available. Definitions of variables in all tables are in the Appendix. N = number of companies per year. The figures shown are equally weighted 
means, except for N and proportion of schemes in deficit. Sources: Worldscope, Bloomberg and annual reports. If companies do not report in 
sterling, we convert their data to sterling at the year-end exchange rate. 
 
Year   N 
Schemes  
 in 
deficit 
Deficit 
£m 
Deficitt/  
Assetst–1 
Contri- 
 bution 
£m 
Contribt/  
Assetst–1 
Service  
cost 
£m 
Service  
costt/  
Assetst–1 
DRC 
£m 
DRCt/ 
Assetst–1 
2003 342 94.2% 157 9.76% 25 1.10% 17 1.00% 8 0.10% 
2004 336 94.1% 140 8.15% 29 1.31% 18 0.90% 11 0.41% 
2005 332 95.5% 155 8.87% 30 1.45% 20 0.86% 10 0.59% 
2006 322 89.8% 74 6.94% 39 1.70% 23 0.86% 16 0.84% 
2007 298 80.9% –3 3.52% 41 1.83% 22 0.80% 19 1.04% 
2008 292 78.8% 103 3.99% 36 1.43% 23 0.64% 12 0.79% 
2009 288 93.4% 181 8.01% 61 1.27% 20 0.45% 41 0.83% 
2010 278 92.8% 184 6.98% 51 1.18% 21 0.37% 30 0.81% 
2011 263 85.2% 187 5.71% 53 1.29% 24 0.37% 29 0.92% 
2012 256 87.9% 230 6.14% 64 1.36% 24 0.34% 39 1.02% 
2013 257 82.9% 215 4.96% 55 1.14% 27 0.31% 28 0.83% 
2014 252 83.7% 274 5.59% 47 1.24% 28 0.29% 19 0.95% 
2015 245 79.2% 224 4.36% 50 1.00% 31 0.31% 19 0.70% 
2016 239 82.9% 303 5.42% 56 1.01% 32 0.30% 24 0.71% 
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Table 1 cont. 
 
Full sample Deficit 
£m 
Deficitt/  
Assetst–1 
Contri- 
 bution 
£m 
Contribt/  
Assetst–1 
Service  
cost 
£m 
Service  
costt/  
Assetst–1 
DRC 
£m 
DRCt/ 
Assetst–1 
Mean 167 6.46% 44 1.32% 23 0.59% 21 0.74% 
Minimum –6,302 –75.34% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% –338 –15.73% 
25th percentile 4 0.72% 1 0.30% 0 0.08% 0 0.02% 
Median 22 3.60% 5 0.77% 2 0.30% 2 0.30% 
75th percentile 92 8.77% 23 1.63% 11 0.75% 10 0.91% 
Maximum 10,400 531.42% 3,343 35.65% 1,207 23.40% 2,761 31.73% 
Number of firm-years 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
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Table 2 
Payout ratios: summary statistics  
 
Payout as a proportion of earnings (net income) and assets. Firm-years with negative net 
income are excluded. Sources: LSPD for regular and special dividends, Worldscope for 
repurchases, net income per share and assets. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Payout per sharet/EPSt Payout per sharet/Assets per sharet–1 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Regular dividend Total payout Regular dividend Total payout 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Mean 65.8% 89.5% 2.9% 4.1% 
 
Minimum 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
25th percentile 28.5% 34.0% 1.3% 1.5%  
 
Median 44.7% 53.9% 2.5% 2.8% 
 
75th percentile 65.2% 84.3% 3.9% 4.8% 
 
Maximum 797.0% 1,126.7% 11.5% 29.5% 
 
N 3,486 3,486 4,000 4,000 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 3 
DPS and payout forecast errors by size of DRC  
 
Mean values of forecast errors for DPS and payout per share, by quartile and sub-quartile of DRCt/Assetst–1. Forecast 
error for each firm-year  =  DPSt – 𝐷𝑃𝑆?̂?, where 𝐷𝑃𝑆?̂? is from the Lintner model with firm-specific coefficients 
estimated by the standard method (eq. 4) or the Leary-Michaely (LM) method (eq. 5). The estimation period for the 
coefficients is 1991-02; we require at least eight consecutive years of data, and at least one year to have non-zero 
payout. Forecasts are for the years 2003-16. DPS and forecast error are scaled by Assets per sharet1. The sample 
using the LM method is smaller because an LM forecast requires an average payout ratio across the eight years, so 
cannot be calculated if there is a loss. N is the number of firm-years per DRC category. Scaled errors are winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***(**)(*) = different from zero at the 1% (5%) (10%) level of significance. 
 
 
Coefficients in Lintner model estimated by  
Standard method  Leary-Michaely method  
Quartile DRC DPS 
Fore-
cast 
error 
Signifi-
cance 
N DRC DPS 
Fore-
cast 
error 
Signifi-
cance 
N 
PANEL A: REGULAR DIVIDEND PER SHARE 
1 –0.23% 3.10% –0.09%  611 –0.20% 3.20% 0.11% ** 591 
2 0.18% 2.81% 0.10% * 610 0.17% 2.76% 0.07% * 590 
3 0.62% 3.13% –0.08%  610 0.60% 3.13% 0.02%  591 
4 2.52% 3.10% –0.39% *** 610 2.47% 3.18% –0.31% *** 591 
1 – 4   0.30% **    0.41% ***  
            
4.1 1.13% 2.93% –0.05%  153 1.10% 3.00% –0.01%  148 
4.2 1.54% 2.93% –0.23% ** 152 1.50% 3.03% –0.19% * 148 
4.3 2.18% 3.12% –0.21%  153 2.13% 3.14% –0.25% ** 148 
4.4 5.24% 3.44% –1.08% *** 152 5.18% 3.57% –0.78% *** 147 
4.1 – 4.4   1.03% ***    0.77% ***  
PANEL B: TOTAL PAYOUT PER SHARE 
1 –0.23% 4.66% –0.14%  611 –0.20% 4.88% 0.29%  591 
2 0.18% 3.69% –0.42% ** 610 0.17% 3.62% –0.22%  590 
3 0.62% 4.40% –0.10%  610 0.60% 4.42% –0.27%  591 
4 2.52% 4.47% –1.25% *** 610 2.48% 4.71% –1.20% *** 591 
1 – 4   1.11% ***    1.49% ***  
            
4.1 1.13% 3.86% –0.96% ** 153 1.10% 3.88% –0.33%  148 
4.2 1.54% 4.20% –0.78%  152 1.51% 4.42% –0.61%  148 
4.3 2.18% 4.84% –1.54% ** 153 2.13% 4.79% –1.18% * 148 
4.4 5.24% 4.98% –1.72% ** 152 5.18% 5.76% –2.70% *** 147 
4.1 – 4.4   0.76%     2.37% ***  
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Table 4 
Reasons for cuts or omissions in DPS, by size of DRC  
 
Columns 1 to 4: proportions of firm-years in which each of four reasons for a cut or omission in regular DPS apply, by category of DRCt/Assetst–1. Column 5: 
proportion of firm-years with a cut or omission. Columns 6 to 9: proportions in which each reason for a cut applies, out of firm-years with DPS cut or zero. 
Column 10: proportion where the cut or omission is not explained by at least one of the reasons, and so could be due to a DRC. The four reasons for a cut or 
omission are (i) loss in year t – 1 or t, (ii) EPSt < 0.5EPSt–1, (iii) DPS is cut in year t but Payout per sharet > DPSt–1, or DPSt–1 = DPSt  =  0 but Payoutt > 3% of    
Assetst–1, (iv) disposal of at least 30% of Assetst–1 in year t – 1 or t. A firm-year can have more than one reason for a cut or omission. The sample consists of 
firm-years with a forecast error using the Leary-Michaely method. ***(**)(*) = proportions differ at the 1% (5%) (10%) level of significance. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Proportion of firm-years with: Of firm-years with DPS cut or zero, proportion with:  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10  
Quartile    Fall in Flexi Disp DPS cut   Fall in  Flexi Disp Due to 
by DRC/ Loss profit payout -osal or zero  Loss profit payout -osal DRC? 
Assetst–1 % % % % % N % % % % % N 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 + 2 18.9 7.0 2.8 1.3 16.0 1,181 61.8 10.7 17.3 2.2 19.7 189 
 
   3 21.2 6.8 3.6 0.9 18.6 591 61.8 8.2 19.1 0.9 19.1 110 
 
   4 21.3 5.8 4.9 2.7 22.0 591 56.2 8.5 22.3 9.2 19.2 130 
 
4 – (1+2) 2.4 –1.7 2.1 ** 1.4 * 6.0 ***  –5.6 ** –2.2 5.0 ** 7.0 *** –0.5 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Within fourth quartile 
 
  4.1 23.0 3.4 5.4 0 17.6 148 65.4 3.9 30.8 0 15.4 26 
 
  4.2 21.6 6.8 6.1 3.4 22.3 148 51.5 12.1 27.3 12.2 12.2 33 
 
  4.3 22.3 8.1 3.4 1.4 23.0 148 61.8 11.8 14.7 5.9 17.7 34 
 
  4.4 18.4 4.8 4.8 6.1 25.2 147 48.7 5.4 18.9 16.2 29.7 37 
 
4.4 – 4.1 –4.6 –2.8 –0.6 6.1 *** 7.6   –16.7 *** 1.6 –11.9 ** 16.2 *** 14.4 ***  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5 
Logit regressions to explain dividend cuts and omissions  
 
The dependent variable is 1 if DPSt < DPSt–1 or if DPSt = 0, and 0 otherwise. Loss dummy = 1 if EPS is 
negative in year t–1 or t; Profitability-fall dummy = 1 if EPSt < 0.5EPSt–1; Disposal dummy = 1 if firm 
makes a disposal of at least 30% of Assetst–1 in year t – 1 or t; Flexi-payout dummy = 1 if DPS is cut in 
year t but Payout per sharet > DPSt–1, or DPSt–1 = DPSt  =  0 but Payoutt > 3% of Assetst–1. The sample 
consists of firm-years with a forecast error using the Leary-Michaely method. Each continuous variable 
is winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. 
***(**)(*) = different from zero at the 1% (5%) (10%) level of significance. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1 2 3 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
DRCt/Assetst–1 8.011* 7.693* 13.744** 
 (4.252) (4.204) (6.049) 
 
Loss dummy  2.727*** 1.2235*** 
  (0.205) (0.226) 
 
Profitability-fall dummy  1.286*** 0.870*** 
  (0.225) (0.225) 
 
Flexi-payout dummy  1.374*** 1.433*** 
  (0.337) (0.342) 
 
Disposal dummy  0.614 0.722 
  (0.438) (0.508) 
 
Net incomet/Assetst–1   –15.837*** 
   (0.955) 
 
∆Net incomet/Assetst–1    6.455*** 
   (1.142) 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,363 2,362 2,362 
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.257 0.309 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 6 
DPS forecast errors excluding cuts and omissions 
 
Mean forecast errors for DPS, excluding firm-years with reduced or zero DPS, by DRC quartile 
and sub-quartile. The sample before exclusions consists of firm-years with a forecast error 
using the Leary-Michaely method. Different sample numbers in the categories arise because of 
different numbers of firm-years excluded. Scaled errors are winsorised at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. ***(**)(*) = means differ at the 1% (5%) (10%) level of significance. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Coefficients in Lintner model estimated by 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Quartile  Standard  Leary-Michaely  
by DRC/  method method   
Assetst–1  % %  N 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   1 0.09 0.30  501 
 
   2 0.34 0.24  491 
 
   3 0.14 0.23  481 
 
   4 –0.23 0.05  461 
 
4 – 1 –0.32 *** –0.29 ***  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Within fourth quartile 
 
  4.1 0.06 0.12  122 
 
  4.2 –0.08 0.09  115 
 
  4.3 –0.03 0.16  114 
 
  4.4 –0.93 –0.20  110 
 
4.4 – 4.1 –0.99 *** –0.32 *  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7 
Regressions to explain payout and capex 
 
Results of OLS and Tobit regressions using equation (8). Standard errors are in parentheses, corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***(**)(*) = significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) 
level. 
 
 OLS OLS OLS Tobit Tobit 
 Divt/  
Assetst–1  
Payoutt/ 
 Assetst–1  
Capext/  
Assetst–1  
Divt/ 
Assetst–1 
Payoutt/ 
Assetst–1 
DRCt/Assetst–1 –0.0536 0.0381 –0.1442** –0.0509 0.0849 
  (0.035) (0.105) (0.069) (0.058) (0.115) 
Qt–1 0.0083*** 0.0132*** 0.0088*** 0.0114*** 0.0177*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
NonpenCFt/Assetst–1 0.1103*** 0.1516*** 0.1297*** 0.1515*** 0.2321*** 
  (0.013) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.027) 
Fundingt/Assetst–1 0.0110 0.0404** 0.0022 0.0205** 0.0723*** 
  (0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) 
Firm-years 3,867 3,866 3,863 3,867 3,866 
Number of firms 441 441 441 441 441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.338 0.170 0.151 n.a. n.a. 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a 
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
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Table 8 
GMM regressions to explain payout and capex 
 
Results of two-step system GMM regressions using equation (9). Standard errors are in parentheses, 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The AR(1) and AR(2) p-values are for 
first- and second-order serial correlation of the residuals, respectively. The Hansen test of over-
identification is to test that all instruments are valid. The diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is to test that 
the instruments used for equations in levels are exogenous. ***(**)(*) = significant at the 1% (5%) 
(10%) level. 
 
 Divt/  
Assetst–1  
Payoutt/  
Assetst–1 
Capext/  
Assetst–1  
Dependent variablet–1 0.8304*** 0.4455*** 0.4520*** 
  (0.054) (0.141) (0.092) 
DRCt/Assetst–1 –0.0060 0.2415 –0.1931 
  (0.114) (0.371) (0.240) 
Capext /Assetst–1 –0.0903* –0.0695   
  (0.034) (0.078)   
Qt–1 –0.0029 0.0100* –0.0009 
  (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
Debtt/Assetst–1  –0.0153 –0.0490** 0.0106 
  (0.010) (0.021) (0.018) 
NonpenCFt/Assetst–1 0.0449** 0.0848 0.0538 
  (0.019) (0.053) (0.058) 
Fundingt/Assetst–1 0.0219 0.0846** –0.0493** 
  (0.013) (0.040) (0.024) 
Salest/Assetst–1     0.0047 
      (0.006) 
        
Observations 3,425 3,425 3,423 
Number of firms 410 410 409 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 p-value 0.566 0.149 0.797 
Hansen test p-value 0.900 0.468 0.330 
Diff-in-Hansen test p-value 0.704 0.558 0.635 
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Table 9 
Regressions to explain funding of DRC  
 
OLS regressions of DRC/Assetst–1 on cash flow and other variables. All variables are scaled by Assetst–1. They are 
listed by cash flow (eq. 10) and financing (eq. 11). Model 5 includes variables related to the pension fund. Outflow 
variables (DRC, Capex, Acq, ∆Workingcap, Divpaid, ∆Cash, Specialdivpaid, Repurchase) have a positive sign if 
there is an outflow. All variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm. ***(**)(*) = significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1 2 3 4 5 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
NonpenCF 0.073*** 0.071***   0.075*** 
 (0.010) (0.010)   (0.014) 
  
Net income   0.015*** 0.16*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Capex –0.042*** –0.038*** –0.008 –0.006 –0.039*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
Acq –0.014** –0.015** –0.003 –0.001 –0.016 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
∆Workingcap –0.013*** –0.014*** –0.003 –0.003 –0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
 
Disposal 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.021** 0.019** 0.050*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) 
 
Divpaid –0.052**  0.017  –0.057* 
 (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.032) 
 
Div  –0.054**  0.006 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
 
∆Cash –0.020*** –0.020*** –0.004 0.001 –0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
 
∆Debt 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.007* 0.006 –0.016*** 
 (0.04) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
 
Share issue 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.005 0.004 0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
Specialdivpaid 0.004  0.016  0.010 
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.027) 
 
Specialdiv  0.019  0.035* 
  (0.020)  (0.019) 
 
Repurchase –0.047*** –0.049*** –0.027** –0.027** –0.044*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)  
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3071842 
43 
 
Table 9 cont. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1 2 3 4 5 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Funding     –0.021** 
     (0.010) 
 
Penliabs     0.008** 
     (0.004) 
 
Expectedrtn     0.029 
     (0.039) 
 
Actualrtn     0.003* 
     (0.002) 
 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,975 3,930 3,975 3,930 2,248 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.16 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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